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Abstra c t 
 
The nature of the risk or threat posed by ‘cyberfraud’ - fraud with a cyber dimension – is examined 
empirically based on data reported by the public and business to Action Fraud. These are used to 
examine the implications for a more effective risk-based response, both by category of fraud and also 
responding to cyberfraud generally, not just in the UK. A key characteristic of cyberfraud is that it can 
be globalised, unless there are major national differences in attractiveness of targets or in the 
organisation of control. This does not mean that all cyberfraud is international, however:  not only do 
some involve face to face interactions at some stage of the crime cycle, but in online auction selling 
frauds, it appears to be common for the perpetrators and victims to reside in the same country.  After 
reviewing patterns and costs of victimisation and their implications for control, the paper concludes 
that any law enforcement response must begin by being strategic: which other public and private 
sector bodies should be involved to do what; what should be the specific roles and responsibilities of 
the police and where ‘problem ownership’ should lie; what are we willing to pay for (in money and 
effort) for greater cybersecurity and how to reduce ‘market failure’ in its supply; and, how that security 
is going to be organised for and/or by the huge numbers of businesses and people that are 
(potentially) affected. 
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Introduc tion 
 
This article looks specifically at the nature of the risk or threat posed by ‘cyberfraud’, fraud with a 
cyber dimension. By examining cybercrime for financial gain, it will seek to develop an outline of the 
implications for a more effective risk-based response, both by category of fraud and also responding 
to cyberfraud generally. While the dataset upon which this article draws relates to England and Wales, 
the article is not focussed exclusively on those countries, but upon what the authors suggest are the 
main risks and threats in any context experiencing an increase in cyberfraud and the steps needed to 
enhance the effectiveness of risk-based responses. One of the key characteristics of cyberfraud is that 
it can be globalised, so what is found in one jurisdiction tends to also be found in another, unless there 
are major national differences in attractiveness of targets or in the organisation of control. This does 
not mean that all cyberfraud is international, however:  not only do some involve face to face 
interactions at some stage of the crime cycle, but in online auction selling frauds, it appears to be 
common for the perpetrators and victims to reside in the same country. 
 
Financial and other risks and threats to current and future ‘Internet of Things’ and ‘Big Data’ processes 
in the ‘cyber’ world are ever present and constantly evolving (see Williams & Burnap 2016). Regular 
national and global cyber ‘threat assessments’ and state-wide Cyber Security Strategies add to the 
‘awareness-raising’ process that puts the probabilities or impacts of certain forms of victimisation on 
the public agenda with varied degrees of sophistication (Williams 2016). Action (pre and post-
victimisation) increases demands on law enforcement for resources for investigation and prosecution 
(while also enhancing the sales of the cybersecurity businesses that have been spawned by the rise of 
e-commerce and social media).  
 
In this market for understanding threat, risk, and effective responses, it is difficult for most consumers, 
businesses, government organisations, and commentators to work out a ‘rational’ response or 
responses, not least because there is a lack of reliable data on the problem, and little helpful agreed 
evidence on ‘what works’ and on who has both the capacity and the motivation to reduce vulnerability 
(Williams & Levi 2015). Moreover, given the often transjurisdictional nature of cyberfrauds, there is 
difficulty in acting against perpetrators, especially because both vulnerabilities and perpetrators are 
dynamic and responses need regular updating in order to be focused and effective. A key challenge 
has been the lack of accurate data and measurement of the nature, scale and impact of cyberfraud, 
largely due to the relatively recent emergence of cybercrime on the criminal justice agenda and its 
poor capture in existing crime surveys and datasets (Levi & Williams 2012). Notwithstanding, some 
areas of business risk have good commercial surveys by vendors and advisers. Nonetheless, it is 
arguable that there is a significant risk that law enforcement and other resources target the wrong 
crimes, fail to instil confidence in victims and potential victims in their ability to prevent cybercrime 
from occurring or are unable to respond effectively because of the nature of the crime and the lack 
of a suitable evidence base for assessing impact. Indeed, there is often confusion over whether any 
guardianship component or mix of components of reassurance policing, target hardening, enhancing 
resilience, or pursuing offenders constitutes ‘effective policing’ of cyberfrauds (Williams 2016).  
 
The optimal enforcement response is also influenced by changes to crime control in the UK which was 
once widely seen as virtually the sole domain and responsibility of law enforcement, but which in the 
past two decades has moved towards ‘plural policing’ in partnership with other agencies (Crawford et 
al. 2005). This shift has resulted in a new emphasis on partnership and information-sharing; between 
and across jurisdictions; the framing of responses to crime in terms of prioritising on the basis of harm, 
disruption, prevention and reduction; the production of explicit and measurable policies, strategies 
or ‘policing plans’ which are themselves ostensibly the result of analyses of crime patterns and trends; 
the application of intelligence-led policing; and the consideration of the priorities of central and local 
government, other agencies and local communities (Maguire and John, 2006; Levi and Maguire, 
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2012).  Levi & Williams (2013) in their study of cooperation within the UK Information Assurance 
Network evidence that the neo-liberal rationality that has been evoked in other areas of crime control 
is also evident in the control of cybercrimes. However, they find divisions exist between the High 
Policing rhetoric of the UK's Cyber Security Strategy and the (relatively) Low Policing cooperation 
outcomes in “on the ground” cyber-policing.   
 
In the area of fraud, which also includes cybercrime for financial gain, similar imperatives also apply 
in terms of law enforcement responses to the public, as well as public and private sector institutions, 
who may approach law enforcement with allegations of criminal conduct or financial loss. An 
awareness of investigation policies and the availability of resources within other institutions and 
regulators, as well as a requirement to follow a broad range of government-initiated policies has seen 
the police commit ever-fewer resources to high-volume, low value cases. This also applies the more 
elite forms of fraud such as insider trading and corporate accounting frauds. The shortfall in resources 
raises questions as to the extent to which the police are able to address the growing threat from 
cybercrime for financial gain, which has long been a problem for fraud generally (Gannon and Doig 
2010; Levi and Maguire, 2012; Doig and Levi 2013).  
 
Esta blishing  a n Evide nc e  Ba se  
 
Given the lack of resources available for responding to cybercrime in general and cybercrime for 
financial gain in particular, we must continuously develop our understanding of the range of risks or 
threats facing victims – corporate, governmental or individual - and tailor roles and responses 
accordingly, to the extent that there are sufficient resources to fulfil those roles. To that end, 
identifying the evidence base on which to predicate law enforcement roles as well as responses of 
those of other organisations (including the relevance and added-value of cybersecurity businesses) is 
necessary in order to develop an effective response.  
 
Some data about offenders can be derived from investigating the circumstances and techniques for 
criminal activity (see this volume), but the evidence is inadequate to test the hypotheses that, for 
example, cybercriminals are more financially motivated than in the past when they were more likely 
to be motivated by gaining kudos; or that traditional, analogue criminals – particularly drug traffickers, 
burglars and robbers – are  digitizing their offending habits by turning to the more sophisticated forms 
of cybercrime in significant numbers, beyond what can be done comparatively easily from ‘crime-as-
a-service’ software kits (Levi et al., 2015a, 2015b). There has also been little evidence on the 
relationships between types of crime, losses incurred, or the nature and level of cyber involvement; 
certainly police recorded data have been poor and/or partial in their coverage, leaving little scope for 
credible refutation of hostile media stories about cybercrime risks and bank/police handling of 
complaints. Currently criminal statistics as well as business and individual victim surveys show that 
fraud in the UK is on the rise, while the crime rates for other types of acquisitive crime are falling. 
However, the evidence base for how ‘cyber’ has contributed to fraud has been incomplete and weak, 
both today and historically. Since ICT platforms have become central to the way business and social 
life is organised, routine activities models lead us to expect that crime follows these changes when 
the opportunity is easily exploitable.  
 
A much more detailed picture of UK cyberfraud has recently emerged as a consequence of improved 
law enforcement reporting arrangements (which is patchily present in other countries also). In the UK, 
following a review of the UK institutional approach to fraud, there is now a centralised reporting 
process for all actual and attempted fraud allegations, including those involving a cyber dimension. 
However, the effectiveness of this process is dependent on victims’ awareness that they have been 
defrauded and willingness to spend the time making reports. The review recommended that there 
should be a National Fraud Reporting Centre as a sole central reporting point for members of the 
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public and both public and private sectors (Attorney General, 2006: 7). This body is located within the 
City of London Police, which was designated as the national lead law enforcement agency responsible 
for policing fraud.  
 
Currently renamed ‘Action Fraud’, the Centre was linked to an intelligence analysis resource: the 
National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB), also located with the City of London Police. In 2013, Action 
Fraud was rolled out nationally. Since 2014 all fraud complaints to the police, unless an immediate 
response is required for a ‘crime in action’, have to be recorded through Action Fraud and not locally. 
Action Fraud collects data for reported frauds by UK individuals and businesses, excluding reports for 
‘plastic crime’ which is collected by CIFAS and FFA UK, to avoid double counting2. The former is a 
member-based fraud prevention service while the latter coordinates information from, and 
preventative approaches for, some sectors of the financial services industry The NFIB role has been to 
synthesise and analyse the data from these three sources  in order to assess patterns and trends, as 
well as directing intelligence packages to the most relevant police force, although it has no control 
over what those individual forces do with its packages, an issue in common with other police 
intelligence bodies including CIFAS and FFA UK .  
 
For a research project intended to explore the implications of economic cybercrimes for a law 
enforcement response (Levi et al., 2015a), the authors were given access to Action Fraud data for all 
fraud and fraud-related offences, including offences recorded under the 2006 Fraud Act and 1990 
Misuse of Computers Act, for October to December 2014. This analysis of the reported cyber 
dimension of fraud enabled a detailed picture to be drawn of the types of frauds reported and, with 
access to the reporting information, the mode of commission of the alleged crime to assess the issues 
faced by law enforcement, organisations and the public3.  
 
What is Cyberfraud and What is the ‘Cyber’ Component thereof? 
 
There is a distinction between cybercrime intended solely to harm – such as online harassment, hate 
speech and child sexual grooming  – and cybercrime for financial gain, including cyberfrauds and 
extortion. There are three main aspects of cybercrime in relation to fraud (Wall, 2005):  
 • Cyber-dependant crimes which would not exist without the internet;  • Cyber-enabled crimes which, if the networked technologies were removed, could still take place 
but locally and on a more one-to-one basis. Being cyber-enabled allows these crimes to be carried 
out at scale for less capital and sometimes with fewer criminal staff than would be needed for 
similar crimes offline; and  • Cyber-assisted crimes which use networked digital technologies in the course of criminal activity 
which would take place anyway.  
 
In focussing particularly on the latter two dimensions of cyberfraud (as the data will show, cyber-
dependent crimes are not the main source of cybercrime for financial gain), one of the questions also 
addressed through the data in seeking to identify where the cyber element occurs, in what forms at 
                                                 
2 For 2013-14 CIFAS and FFA UK sent to the NFIB data on ‘card not present’ fraud, lost or stolen cards and ATM fraud, representing over two-
thirds of the total of over 333,000 reported offences and, while most will involve a cyber dimension, the data are not differentiated in the 
same way as Action Fraud data. This will continue to be the case despite the integration of those commercial sources into the crime statistics 
(see Levi, this volume).  
 
3 The analysis of the data was supplemented with interviews with principal agencies for economic crime control, financial services and 
industrial firms, cybercrime prevention bodies in the public and private sectors, and police officers (retired and current) across the UK. 
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any stage, from the planning of a crime through to its execution, to the expenditure and/or laundering 
of its proceeds.  
 
Wha t is the  sc a le  of, a nd the  thre a t from, c ybe rfra ud in the  UK?  
 
This study preceded the extension of the national statistics to cover a broader range of cyber-related 
frauds in England and Wales (ONS, 2016; Levi, this volume). Overall, there were 106,681 reported 
incidents in the dataset provided to the authors by Action Fraud4 - of these, 4,062 (4%) involved 
computer misuse crime, a much smaller proportion than might have been expected, perhaps because 
people whose systems become infected by malware do not bother calling Action Fraud, if indeed they 
are aware of it and see it as a prelude to fraud against themselves or others. The two largest 
components of computer misuse crime involved malware, and hacking of emails and social media.  
 
The analysis of the data suggested that well over half of incidents were significantly cyber-related: 
43% were cyber-enabled, 13% were cyber-dependent, while a further 29% of them simply used 
technology (cyber-assisted); see Table 1. 
   
Table 1: Cyber-involvement 
 Numbers % of all % of cyber-involvement 
Cyber-assisted 30,759 28.8% 34.2% 
Cyber-enabled 45,293 42.5% 50.4% 
Cyber-dependant 13,859 13.0% 15.4% 
Not applicable 16,773 15.7%  
Total 106,681 100.0% 100.0% 
 
By volume, the single largest types of reported fraud are banking and credit industry frauds (33%), a 
large proportion of which (18%) are cheque, payment card and online bank account frauds. This is 
followed by non-investment frauds (28.6%), which include online shopping and auctions (11.6%) and 
also computer software service frauds (7.9%). The latter, which may be categorised as cyber-
dependent crimes, may include, for example, fake antivirus and ransomware fraud. Advance fee 
frauds (and their different forms) follow (14.1%). Specific technology-related offences are less 
prevalent, covering telecom industry fraud (misuse of contracts) at 4.5%. The remainder of the 
offences are relatively small in volume.  
Table 2 presents data for reported crime by volume by category (including the two largest sub-
categories within each).  
 
Table 2: Typology of reported frauds  
Fraud type Number of 
frauds 
Proportion of 
total reported 
frauds 
Banking and credit industry fraud 34,913 32.7% 
Cheque, plastic card and online bank accounts (not PSP) 19,127 18% 
Application fraud (excluding mortgages) 10,091 9.5% 
Non-investment fraud 30,490 28.6% 
Online shopping and auctions 12,405 11.6% 
Computer software service fraud 8,455 7.9% 
                                                 
4 There are some inconsistencies in the Action Fraud data relating to the total number of cases; this is due to missing data although totals 
match up closely wherever possible. It is also worth highlighting that the analysis presented in this report is not comparable to official ONS 
analysis due to different datasets covering different time periods.  
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Advance fee payments 15,065 14.1% 
Other advance fee frauds 7,498 6.7% 
Lender loan fraud 2,078 1.9% 
No identified category 12,404 11.6% 
Categories as % of total 92,872 87% 
Total  106,681 100% 
 
Analysis of the reporting information suggests that, despite the global figures in Table 2, the cyber 
dimension is much more nuanced. The data highlights that the internet has not always been the source 
or medium of the initial contact that led to a fraud. The single most common way that offenders first 
contacted their victims was by phone or text (35%). Almost a fifth (18%) were contacted after visiting 
a website, 12% in person, letters and fax (11%) and 8% by email. From these data, the overall degree 
of involvement of network technologies can be estimated, though with some caveats5, and are 
summarised in Table 3.  
 
Table 3: Frauds by first contact method by offender  
Contact method Number of 
frauds 
Proportion of total 
reported frauds 
Phone call, text message or similar 31,088 35% 
Visit to a website 15,587 18% 
Other 11,625 13% 
In person 10,932 12% 
Letter or fax 10,159 11% 
Email 6,859 8% 
Web forum, chat room or similar 1,582 2% 
TV, radio or online advert, or flyer 462 1% 
Newspaper, magazine 179 0% 
Total 88,473 100% 
 
The data prima facie suggest that frauds using networked technologies are actually relatively low as a 
proportion of the total of frauds reported. However, it is likely that the data actually underestimate 
the extent of cyber-involvement throughout the crime, because the data derived from the reporting 
stage reflect only first contact by the offender. Also, many cyberfrauds are ‘micro-frauds’, very small 
impact bulk victimisations that are too small individually to pursue, even if reported (Wall, 2010:68). 
It was also found that whilst many economic crimes involve a cyber-element at a particular point, for 
example emails or phone calls generated via voice over internet protocol (VOIP) might be used to 
make initial contact and ‘hook’ a victim, after which the fraudster will take over and monetise the 
victim’s personal information. Subsequently, it is not always clear for Action Fraud classifiers, or 
indeed for reporting victims, when the fraud actually began or at what point the cyber component 
occurs. This relates to a wider challenge of defining fraud. Is it at the point of initial contact, or later 
                                                 
5 Percentages are indicative rather than absolute, and are adjusted for cyber-involvement (email+visit to a website+web 
forum+(0.66) of TV, radio or online advert, or flyer) (‘in person’ and ‘other’ have been excluded). Classification depends on 
when the victim feels the fraud began, e.g. at first contact, or the point at which money was being requested. With most 
frauds today, online usually goes offline to get the money. Blanks are excluded and percentages are based upon total known 
information. ‘Simplified’ means main offence and information are joined. As the table illustrates, the Action Fraud headlines 
format is not very useful in demonstrating cyber-involvement. 
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on when an attempt to extract money takes place? This is different from the distinction between 
attempted and realised fraud; some victims are carefully groomed and often will not realise that they 
have been defrauded until after the event, if at all.  
 
Nevertheless, the data do provide a clear indication of the different levels of cyber-involvement in the 
different offences although, at this point, they do not reveal the role played by ICT in the offences: 
this can only be seen when it is cross-tabulated by fraud type. In the early stages of Action Fraud, 
reported offences that use networked technologies are relatively rare.  When the data are ordered 
according to the level of estimated cyber-involvement, they cut across6 a number of the Action Fraud 
data headings: see Table 4. The data – which are reported quite fully to emphasise the variations by 
crime type of frauds other than cyber-dependent ones – allow us to assess the degree of estimated 
cyber-involvement for specific types of fraud and help to better understand where ICT is involved.  
However we caveat that the judgements about cyber-involvement made by victims or report 
classifiers should be treated with substantial reservation.  
 
Table 4: Level of cyber-involvement in cyber-enabled and  cyber-assisted frauds (Offender First 
Contact Method)  
Action Fraud category/sub-categories Total Cyber-
involvement 
% of Cyber-
involvement 
Dating scam 835 737 88% 
Online shopping and auctions 11,350 9754 86% 
Counterfeit cashiers' cheques 559 428 77% 
Rental fraud 773 572 74% 
Ticket fraud 910 655 72% 
Mandate fraud 966 520 54% 
Mortgage related fraud  144 69 48% 
Fraudulent applications for grants from charities 9 4 44% 
Business trading fraud 124 38 31% 
Other regulatory fraud 72 22 31% 
Prime bank guarantees 12 3 30% 
Other consumer non-investment fraud 4,703 1358 29% 
Fraud by failing to disclose information 160 46 29% 
Pension fraud by pensioner (or their estates) 7 2 29% 
Charity fraud 238 63 27% 
Insurance broker fraud 39 10 26% 
Pyramid or Ponzi schemes 164 38 24% 
Other fraud 11,553 2250 19% 
Cheque, plastic card and online bank accounts (not 
PSP) 13,437 2449 18% 
Consumer phone fraud 352 61 18% 
Fraudulent applications for grants from 
government funded organisations 41 7 17% 
Other financial investment 1,017 170 17% 
Bankruptcy and insolvency 18 3 17% 
                                                 
6 Our analysis orders the fraud types in terms of cyber-involvement via first contact. Including all of the types of cybercrime 
(assisted, enabled, and dependent), it is calculated from the combination of the following values (email+visit to a 
website+web forum+(0.66) of TV, radio or online advert, or flyer) (‘in person’ and ‘other’ have been excluded). 
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HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) fraud 6 1 17% 
Lender loan fraud 1,929 319 17% 
Other advance fee frauds 6,794 1017 15% 
Inheritance fraud 743 109 15% 
‘419’ advance fee fraud 550 80 15% 
Door to door sales and bogus tradesmen 1,242 170 14% 
Banking and credit industry fraud – information 3,637 495 14% 
Share sales or boiler room fraud 387 44 11% 
Dishonestly retaining a wrongful credit 32 3 11% 
Corporate procurement fraud 33 3 9% 
Pension fraud committed on pensions 24 2 8% 
Insurance related fraud 253 20 8% 
Lottery scams 1,238 97 8% 
False accounting 133 9 7% 
Fraud recovery 368 26 7% 
Time shares and holiday club fraud 219 15 7% 
Application fraud (excluding mortgages) 6,350 428 7% 
Retail fraud 1,660 109 7% 
Fraud by abuse of position 500 29 6% 
Pension liberation fraud 230 12 5% 
Telecom industry fraud (misuse of contracts) 3,194 119 4% 
Corporate employee fraud 451 12 3% 
Computer software service fraud 7,813 167 2% 
Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) fraud 9 0 0% 
Passport application fraud 1 0 0% 
 
Thus, on the one hand, if a targeted response is being considered from the data, then traditional ‘419’ 
advance fee payment frauds are found to be very low in cyber-involvement (15%), whereas others, 
such as dating/romance scams (88%) and online shopping and auctions (86%) have the largest cyber 
component. But the data have limitations. So, within advance fee payments, the first contact method 
for lottery scams suggests 8% cyber-involvement; dating scams involve fewer cases but suggest 88% 
cyber-involvement; lender loan fraud represents nearly 14% of all advance fee payments, but only 
17% cyber-involvement on first contact method.  Furthermore, it is not immediately apparent which 
offences are cyber-enabled and which are cyber-dependent. Data are insufficient to develop 
horizontal or vertical analyses of perpetrators, specialisms, networks or interactions, or information 
sources for exploitation, although repeat victimisation requires such networks.  
 
From the Action Fraud data, however, it is also possible to identify which types of fraud are most 
lucrative for the fraudster, especially where the most money is lost by the victim. Although it is worth 
noting that to generate criminal profits data we would have to know about operational costs to 
offenders and how many victims over what period they had defrauded, which might span several 
jurisdictions. In many cases, even with criminal network analysis software, it is unlikely that this 
information can be deduced from victimisation data alone, unlinked to identified (but not necessarily 
caught or convicted) offenders. It is, however, possible to calculate the median financial losses by the 
main categories of fraud: medians generate less distortion of the data than the figures alone or means, 
though there is still potential for inaccuracies. These victim cost data are presented in Table 5.  
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Table 5: Median amounts given to fraudster by victim  
Fraud type Estimated loss to 
fraudsters per victim7 
Pension fraud £38,974 
Business trading fraud £28,609 
Financial investments £21,534 
Bankruptcy and insolvency £20,000 
Fraudulent applications for grants from government-funded 
organisations 
£11,500 
Fraud by abuse of position of trust £8,100 
Corporate fraud £3,869 
Department of Work and Pensions(DWP)Fraud £3,298 
False accounting £2,000 
Other regulatory fraud £2,000 
Banking and credit industry fraud £1,721 
Insurance fraud £1,084 
Advance fee payments £784 
Computer misuse crime £536 
Fraud by failing to disclose information £440 
None of the above £420 
All charity fraud £390 
HM revenue & customs fraud (HMRC) £281 
Non-investment fraud £274 
Telecom industry fraud (misuse of contracts) £112 
 
The data in the Table reveal that the most money was lost by corporate rather than by individual 
victims through pension fraud, business trading fraud, financial investments, and bankruptcy and 
insolvency fraud.  On the other hand, more reported cases have individual than business victims. There 
is no clear relationship between the volume of cases and the value of financial losses, nor between 
those involving individuals and organisations.  Nor is there a clear relationship between either of these 
and the level of cyber-involvement in a fraud. 
 
The data provide some useful graded indications of the self-assessed impact of fraud upon the victim8, 
enhance our understanding of the victims’ perspectives and thus helps to prioritise action (in 
combination with judgments of how feasible a case will be to take forward to criminal justice). This 
analysis is presented in Table 6. It shows that the types of fraud with the most impact on the ‘victims’ 
are: ‘pyramid or Ponzi offences’, followed by ‘dishonestly retaining a wrongful credit’, ‘fraud by abuse 
of position of trust’ and ‘pension frauds’. By comparison, offline retail fraud has the lowest impact on 
                                                 
7 The table illustrates the amounts lost to fraudsters per victim. It is estimated by using the median rather than the average 
because the averages are skewed by large standard deviations, and often estimations of loss. The Advance fee frauds, for 
example, are numerous and yield relatively small amounts to fraudsters. The data field is skewed because of some large 
entries, so, to correct for these, the median has been used to demonstrate the difference. 
 
8 The City of London police graded self-assessed harm into the following categories: a) ‘Concerned about the fraud but it has 
not impacted on health or financial well-being’; b) ‘Minor - only a small impact on either health or financial well-being’; c) 
‘Significant - impacting on health or financial well-being’; d) ‘Severe - have received medical treatment as a result of this 
crime and/or at risk of bankruptcy’. There is an ‘other’ category, which is where the impact is either unknown or not deemed 
relevant to reporting the case. 
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victims (perhaps because it is likely to be reimbursed via payment card firms). Again the degree of 
cyber-involvement associated with each type of offence, is highly variable, although cyberfrauds 
against individuals registers as the most significant in terms of harm.  
Table 6: Fraud impact levels by self-assessed severity  
Fraud type % of 
severe 
Harm 
factor7 
% Cyber-involvement 
Pyramid or Ponzi Schemes 74% 2.87 24% 
Dishonestly retaining a wrongful credit 73% 2.73 11% 
Other financial investment 70% 2.77 17% 
Fraud by abuse of position of trust 70% 2.76 6% 
Rental fraud 68% 2.70 74% 
Pension fraud committed on pensions 67% 2.80 8% 
Lender loan fraud 66% 2.68 17% 
Dating/romance scam 64% 2.65 88% 
Other regulatory fraud 62% 2.67 31% 
Bankruptcy and insolvency 60% 2.80 17% 
 
Notwithstanding the limitations from identification and reporting, the data do point to where the 
biggest threat from cyberfraud lies (and thus one of the grounds for deciding if this should be one of 
the main foci of any cyber-related law enforcement response). On the other hand, those categories 
reflecting the biggest losses – such as pension, business trading and financial investment frauds - are 
areas where cyber-enablement or cyber-dependency was not an obvious significant factor. Those 
offences with significant cyber-involvement seem to vary in both number of cases, average loss and 
likelihood of realistic levels of recovery (where such data is available), as shown in Table 7. The data 
also show that some of the financial loss of frauds is unlikely to be recovered for the victims (though 
the number of cases where recovery is known is a small percentage of the total, and the true position 
is likely to be much worse). 
 
Table 7: Estimated median amounts lost to, and recovered from, the fraudster by highest levels of 
cyber-involvement9  
Fraud type (sub-categories) % of Cyber-
involvement 
Estimated 
median loss per 
victim (£) 
Estimated median 
recovery per victim 
Dating/romance scam 88% £2,595 (n=528) £1,700 (n=27) 
Online shopping and auctions 86% £210 (n=9,329) £160 (n=483) 
Counterfeiting cashiers’ cheques 77% Not known £305 (n=36) 
Rental fraud 74% £980 (n=603) £700 (n=28) 
Ticket fraud 72% £450 (n=897) £528 (n=32) 
Computer virus/malware/spyware 71% £100 (n=191) £132 (n=48) 
Denial of service attack 55% 
£605 (n=6) 
£6 (n=1) 
 
Mandate fraud 54% £9,820 (n=682) £3845 (n=32) 
                                                 
9 The number of cases may differ because: a) the recoveries may be from a different time period to the losses; b) there are 
fewer recoveries than losses because i) there are simply fewer recoveries ii) recoveries from any given set of losses may arise 
in subsequent time periods iii) there may be inaccuracies in the reporting process (e.g. the losses may be overestimated, or 
the person who lost the money may not know that it was recovered, say by someone else, such as a bank). 
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Table 8, conversely, shows that those areas where the greater (mean or median) amounts are likely 
to be recovered are in the business or public sectors (such as DWP, HMRC, business trading fraud or 
false accounting) where cyber-involvement is low (the highest level of cyber-involved first contact 
method was less than 16%).  
 
Table 8: Average amounts (median and mean) recovered from fraudsters  
 Amount recovered  
Fraud type Median Mean N 
Financial investments £7,107 £39,958 150 
Banking and credit industry fraud £1,621 £47,542 966 
Corporate fraud £988 £35,863 47 
Pension fraud £24,244 £30,904 10 
HM Revenue & Customs Fraud (HMRC) £40,141 £40,141 2 
Fraud by abuse of position of trust £1,629 £20,882 30 
 
Overall the data provide an evidential basis for understanding which frauds have the greater and lesser 
levels of cyber-involvement, to illuminate some considerations – and challenges – for developing any 
effective risk-based responses by law enforcement.  
 
The  implic a tions for a n e ffe c tive  risk- ba se d re sponse : wha t do the  
da ta  te ll us?  
 
The data provide only a ‘snapshot’ insight into cyberfraud, showing that ICT plays a substantial but far 
from exclusive role in criminal fraud. Before commenting further, we would note two negative or 
unresolved issues that inform the imperfect nature of the picture the data presents.  
 
First, the data are not completely accurate. The cyber component of reported fraud is ill-represented 
as a standalone data field. Hard to capture (even for the victim) is when the fraud involves different 
types of networked technology, such as VOIP through the phone system, enabling offenders to engage 
cheaply and less identifiably than with traditional technologies with victims online. While cyber-
enabled or cyber-dependent economic crime appears to be just over a quarter (27%) of Action Fraud 
reports, other indications suggest that cyber-assisted crime is around 60%.  Furthermore, it is mistaken 
to see crimes in a binary way as either online or offline because many start online, until a victim is 
hooked; then the fraud may go offline. Other crimes stay online all of the time – at least prior to 
cashing out the proceeds - for example, many dating/romance scams and some other advance fee 
frauds, and most computer misuse crimes.  
 
The second issue is the lack of information on perpetrator profiles and their organisation or 
interaction, information sources and approaches. Victims seldom know to what extent ‘organised 
crime’ is involved or whether those involved are highly computer literate or rely on crimeware-as-a-
service where cybercriminals access on-line specialists to supply to them the means, such as malicious 
software, supporting infrastructure, stolen personal and financial data. The data especially do not 
allow easy identification of how far the same groups or individuals operate different frauds, how far 
they specialise, whether (or how) they share approaches, software or lists of potential victims (repeat 
victimisation is a noteworthy feature of cyberfraud), how they network, organise or cooperate.  
 
Despite respondents’ beliefs at the time of reporting that 97% of ‘their’ offenders were in the UK, we 
also know that the geographic location of the perpetrators, or the locations for different aspects of 
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the crime, including servers, is very difficult to identify – with all the attendant difficulties of 
investigation and prosecution where there is an overseas dimension. In other words, the crime scenes, 
as well as the likelihood of access to documents, witnesses and equipment, are less clear than the 
data make them appear to be. 
 
On the other hand, the Action Fraud data do reveal a complex and nuanced picture of cyberfraud with 
significant but specific types of cyber-dependant, cyber-enabled and cyber-assisted crimes, 
information on losses and number of incidents, differentiated patterns of cyber-involvement and the 
impact on victims. We can argue that cyber-enabled fraud reflects much greater financial losses than 
cyber-dependant crimes, whose losses are more likely to be incurred through payment for business 
disruption and recovery. In particular we would note in terms of responses: 
 • There is a high level of cyber involvement in reported cases of fraud, but there is no 
established pattern of what crimes are cyber-involved, or who carries them out; • Cyber-involvement is an elastic term, given its role among a number of other media in 
initiating and perpetrating frauds; • Financial losses can be substantial by case, by crime, but there are variations – not all 
cyberfraud results in significant losses and not all frauds involve ICT (except perhaps in the 
trivial sense that financial transfers usually are electronic, whatever form they take); • Even in those industries with well-established prevention and protection approaches, such as 
financial services, the level of reported cyberfraud and cybercrime remains high, though much 
is prevented; • The level of loss recovery from cyberfrauds is relatively low (as it also is from other crimes: 
see Home Affairs Committee, 2016). 
 
The key point from the data is that the main perception or fear of cybercrime relates to denial of 
access, disruption and loss of data and identifiers (see Levi et al 2015b) but, in practice, few of these 
result in actual immediate and direct financial loss to victims. There is a substantial level of high-
volume, often low-value, cyberfraud with varying degrees of harm, in which the cyber component 
varies by crime. This heterogeneity can and should influence law enforcement responses, but not in a 
simple way either for prevention or for offender pursuit.  
 
The  implic a tions for a n e ffe c tive  re sponse : wha t a re  the  ma in issue s 
for a ny law e nforc e me nt re sponse ?  
 
From the victim perspective, the data do address some significant policy- and law enforcement-related 
issues within the volume-value-category-cyber matrix: the majority of cyberfrauds are high-volume, 
low value with low levels of recovery, usually targeted at individuals. Thus we need to be concerned 
not merely whether or not a differentiated response is required at national and local levels, but also 
whether such a response requires a reactive investigative response and/or a technical-led 
investigative capability; whether the emphasis should be on awareness and education and how should 
any response balance volume, loss, harm, perpetrator or deterrence as the main drivers of any 
response.  Such a response should also take into account the empirically tested effectiveness of 
individual and national level reduction mechanisms (Williams 2016). 
 
Second, and not unique to cyberfrauds, any response has to take account of a landscape that changes 
dramatically as networked technologies transform the way that fraud could be organised, as 
cybercrime has become more professional, harder to identify and/or recognise, and provides 
anonymity for offenders, at least under normal conditions, without significant forensic investigation 
efforts that are highly limited in absolute availability and cost. An emerging and dynamic cybercrime 
threat landscape that challenges policing is the human-centred interactive ecosystem of the Social 
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Web where the threats posed by cybercrime frequently elude more traditional approaches to 
policing10. Activity conducted via the Social Web represents a new frontier for national and 
international security and crime fighting, yet such interactive spaces remain largely unregulated. Given 
the scale, international reach and open nature of the Social Web, the police struggle to meet an 
expectation of protection from the public, due not just to resources and skills but to a perceived lack 
of actionable intelligence on emerging cyber threats. As technologies become cheaper and more 
widely available, the increase in global internet penetration, new users, activities and products will be 
incorporated into what is now a global online community, growing the pool of both potential victims 
and criminal actors. Easier access means a greater proportion of users than previously may be 
unfamiliar with technologies, making them ‘easy targets’ both as intermediaries for (e.g. botnets, 
money mules) and as victims of fraud.  
 
Third, the Action Fraud reports and other data from CIFAS and FFAUK suggest that cyberfrauds have 
been rising, though the lack of comparable data for previous years makes this a matter of very 
plausible interpretation rather than demonstrable fact (see Levi, this volume).  Given the rise in the 
number of Internet-enabled devices and the proportion of the population who are connected, it would 
be a surprise if this were not so.  Given a large number of people around the world with the motivation 
to defraud and so many situational opportunities outside their domestic jurisdictions that the internet 
now provides, it may be impressive (but not reassuring) that the reported cyberfraud rate is not 
higher. Strategic planners need to consider what it would take to produce a much higher (or lower) 
cyberfraud rate. 
 
The data also indicate that there are significant variations in the impact of cyberfraud by crime 
category and even within the latter, there are non-trivial variations in the level of cyber involvement 
in the crime, in the types of victims (whether businesses or individuals), the interplay between cyber 
involvement and other communication modes for the commission of the crime, and the losses 
associated with the crime. Such variations have implications for effective risk-based responses. 
 
The  implic a tions for a n e ffe c tive  re sponse : wha t should be  the  ma in 
c onside ra tions for polic y?  
 
First, as it is the sovereign responsibility of the state to protect its citizens, including its critical national 
infrastructure, financial services, key commercial intellectual property and government secrets, 
against cybercriminals, including other national governments, it is a reasonable demand to require 
government to provide the necessary state response, requiring the engagement of the intelligence 
agencies, strong and effective intra- and inter-country collaborative, information-sharing and support 
networks. Certainly it would be expected that any national government develops a strategy that seeks 
to address cybercrime and to identify those government and other agencies to whom specific roles 
and responsibilities, as well as resources, could be devolved.  
 
Second, given the trends and approaches to both policing and to fraud, as noted above, there is likely 
to be a clear limit to the reliance on an open-ended law enforcement response, and to a reliance solely 
on law enforcement to respond, given the median amounts involved, the investigative and evidential 
accessibility, the low likely recovery of the proceeds of cyberfraud, and the problematic nature of both 
crime scene and geographic location of perpetrators. Clearly policing cyberfraud involves a multiplicity 
of national and transnational actors intervening both before and after the criminal activity: but it is 
not clear how far law enforcement, given its competing agendas and resources, can investigate 
                                                 
10 Examples of the Social Web include online interactive mainstream media, interactive blogs, and the suite of technologies often referred 
to as social media. 
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cyberfraud that has – or may have - international dimensions which are not readily penetrable on a 
routine basis.  
 
Third, there may be a symbolic need for law enforcement to show particular criminal networks and 
individuals that involvement in crime has its costs, even if – as has been shown in the rapid revival of 
alternative drug and identity data cryptomarkets following take downs such as DarkMarket, Silk Road 
and Onymous (see Décary-Hétu and Giommoni, and Dupont, this volume) – the impact on crime and 
precursor availability is modest. Target audiences may include not just the immediate offenders but 
others at home and abroad, and also potential perpetrators, victims and potential victims who may 
need reassurance and/or a continuing message of intent. Similarly, the technical knowledge from 
investigations and inter-country cooperation would be essential inputs into organisations in both 
public and private sectors to ensure their in-house capacity is informed with credible awareness and 
alert campaigns.  If part of the police reaction is to be intelligence -led and proactive, how is this to be 
achieved?  What kinds of fresh and existing sources can be deployed to get a better and quicker picture 
of offending and offender networking than exist at the present? 
 
Fourth, we are persuaded from the Action Fraud data that relatively little of the reported cyberfraud 
lends itself to a traditional reactive law enforcement response, though it may be susceptible to 
specifically targeted significant awareness and prevention campaigns (‘Protect’ and ‘Prepare’ in the 
jargon of the Home Office) that aim to encourage new and bolster existing individual level security 
behaviours, some of which have been shown to be effective in reducing cybercriminal victimisation 
(Williams 2016). Even once messages are disseminated, on radio, television, the press, and via friends 
and families, however, there are always some that do not follow the advice or who wrongly interpret 
the message and engage in economically damaging avoidance behaviours, and consideration may 
have to be given to automated security with opt-out rather than opt-in requirements (for example, 
for on-line banking), especially if insecurity can cause problems for others, like botnets.  
 
Here we suggest also that further research, like that of Williams (2016) on the effectiveness of 
individual level security behaviours, and behavioural studies on mechanisms of security adoption, be 
done on national longitudinal datasets where they exist.  Such research would help identify what 
needs to be done to enable and nudge such people to take action to protect themselves and make 
better informed judgments, whilst allowing them to continue to enjoy the benefits of the internet. 
Certainly the imperfect information on the nature, motivation and geographic location of the 
perpetrator, as well as the limited likelihood of any law enforcement intervention would require a 
‘nudge’ to financial and other services to be more proactive in requiring the use of mandated software, 
if only to encourage more security awareness and less self-determination among businesses and the 
public, particularly for those who do not have a common understanding of what to do to protect 
themselves, and why.   
 
There is scope for a more dynamic, structured and response-focused approach to guidance, warnings 
and awareness-raising, including the identification of and support for organisations and media sources 
that have an established engagement with individuals who may thus be more predisposed to listen. 
Similarly, there is a role for law enforcement or other approved bodies to set up educational ‘mock 
operations’ to warn users who respond to fraudulent offers of different kinds (created by the 
authorities) that they could have become victims of fraud, via on-screen ‘pop ups’ (such tactics could 
also be used on criminal marketplaces as warnings to those seeking illicit products or co-offenders on 
the web.) This may have particular resonance for repeat victims. 
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An e ffe c tive  re sponse : wha t should be  the  ove ra rc hing  the me s?  
 
Overall, we are not in a position to offer a fully-evidenced effective risk-based strategy to address risk 
and threats where there is no clear answer from the data, but we would argue that the Anglo-Welsh 
case study provides a basis for continuing dialogue on these important social and economic issues, 
which touch an ever-increasing proportion of the population in the UK and elsewhere.  
If we are asked to consider that would be a general optimal law enforcement response in the light of 
these data, and bearing in mind the problems that law enforcement, organisations, and governments 
will continue to face in  cost to pay-off questions vis-à-vis cybercrimes, we would argue that this must 
range from the internet server and services providers actively developing means to promote secure 
use and reduce the risk of threat of economic loss, to using transnational criminal justice to render 
the most damaging cybercrimes unprofitable, and to engaging users and customers in a proactive 
awareness of prevention and protection. Further, any role in cyberfraud reduction shows the need for 
clarity in tasking and in the messaging from strategic, operational and symbolic police actions.  
Assessing the cost, impact or added-value of investigations or prosecutions, disruption and asset 
recovery on domestic and foreign offenders remains in its infancy (see Dupont and see Décary-Hétu 
& Giommoni, this issue; see also Metcalf and Spring, 2015; Spring, 2014): but it needs very careful 
consideration for each case, particularly in terms of cross-border intelligence and cooperation 
arrangements. In addition, and in line with contemporary approaches to partnership/’plural’ policing 
and engagement with stakeholders and communities of interest, attention needs to be given to the 
roles and responsibilities of the network of relevant agencies and industries (the UK Information 
Assurance community, including Cyber-security Information Sharing Partnership initiatives -
https://www.cert.gov.uk/cisp/) and to a realistic assessment of what they may be better placed to 
provide, or able to offer in the way of complementary support (Levi & Williams 2013).  This is a 
dynamic process, and the negotiation of agreements and resourcing are a necessary but not sufficient 
condition of actual cooperation. 
There is an important self-interest not only in organisations taking their own initiatives to address 
cybercrime but also in coordination and cooperation between organisations, where the law 
enforcement role will be primarily one of disruption and occasional deterrence, as well as providing 
guidance and information on emerging risks and threats, issues particularly true of small to medium 
enterprises (SMEs). Larger organisations often have dedicated ICT departments and are better 
informed of the risks and threats. They are also likely to be able to afford the appropriate resourcing 
responses. For them, the issue is less of awareness and education, or even having access to law 
enforcement resources to investigate and prosecute fraud, than access to specialist guidance on 
threat and risk profiles and types to design and deploy responses, leaving law enforcement to identify 
and take action against the identifiable groups who initiate the more significant or recurring cyber-
attacks against them. For SMEs, dedicated awareness and educative responses are required (Levi & 
Williams 2013). A combination of experience to increase perceptions of risks and having 
mitigations/solutions in place would likely help overcome the resource, expertise and scepticism 
barrier for the majority. It is important here to consider the need for ‘knock-on’ effects, such as 
through the supply chain, which can generate systemic weaknesses if not addressed. It may also be 
important to supplement such responses with specialist guidance and advice on a planned basis.  
Of much more concern is addressing the same challenges at the level of the individual victims where, 
as the Action Fraud data suggests, the majority of cyberfrauds by number, though not by value, take 
place. Any strategy for policing cyberfraud needs to have a significant educative component that is 
intelligible (a) to victims and intended victims and (b) to those in a position to monitor behaviour and 
provide relevant advice. Such an approach also has to recognise and reflect the specific characteristics 
of the crime itself. People have to have a common understanding of what to do to protect themselves, 
and why, know what to do and to actually carry out these measures and review them over time. Cyber-
fraud prevention is not a one-time effort, and both online and offline social engineering seeks to move 
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potential victims away from the protections they might know about in the abstract to their informed 
use in practice.  
There is scope for a more dynamic, structured and response-focused approach to guidance, warnings 
and awareness-raising, and the police can play a collaborative role in arrangements to provide that 
advice before and after individuals become victims.  For public reassurance and for 
deterrence/incapacitation, some police action is needed and more up-skilling for existing officers – or 
employing specialist civilian staff - is necessary.  Some 5,000 police have been given a modest amount 
of training via the College of Policing, and this is a beginning. Our suggested next steps for this include 
the need for better, early education of risk management and a focus on helping vulnerable citizens to 
appreciate and manage the risks of both online and offline fraud, and this may be better done via 
peers and the third sector than by the police and websites alone, however user-friendly.   
 
Conc lusion 
The routinisation and pervasiveness of internet use has made certain types of internet-based crimes 
for economic gain possible (cyber-dependant economic crimes), and has facilitated immensely the 
scale of others (cyber-enabled and cyber-assisted economic crimes) by reducing the cost and effort of 
reaching out to potential victims. Cyberspace content is constantly evolving, for an extensive range of 
functions, services and products, while also providing platforms for aggregation and innovation, in the 
perpetration of cyberfraud. Cyberspace has multiple criminal actors living in many jurisdictions whose 
typologies and methods of organisation and operation do not lend themselves easily to existing 
definitions and understanding, e.g. in terms of ‘hotspots’ analysis.  
 
Cyberspace is developing its own criminal marketplaces and financial arrangements, some of which 
require specialist awareness and access to address. The perpetration of cyberfraud outstrips current 
preventative and other measures for control protection and has increased the difficulties of 
identifying, investigating and prosecuting offenders as much as it has increased vulnerabilities to 
businesses, governments and to individuals (including the general public). There is widespread 
agreement that policing in the UK and also around the world has fallen behind the curve of evolving 
patterns of crime, especially cyberfrauds and the cyber-forensic aspects of police investigations. The 
latter is expensive and time-consuming, even disregarding the enormous forensic resources for child 
sexual exploitation online. 
 
Given the very differentiated and nuanced nature of cyberfraud, however, it is clear that any response, 
including that of law enforcement, must be a collective and strategic approach with the intention of:  
Increasing the effort the offender must make to carry out the crime; increasing the risks the offender 
must face in completing the crime, including cashing out the proceeds; reducing the rewards or 
benefits the offender expects to obtain from the crime; removing excuses that offenders may use to 
rationalise or justify their actions; reducing incentives, opportunities and access to expertise that may 
tempt or incite offenders into criminal acts; increasing the awareness of potential victims of the need 
for prevention and understanding of risk; increasing the roles and responsibilities of internet 
providers, and organisations who provide services through the internet, in building in security and 
building in buy-in from users, customers, etc; and balancing guidance, reassurance and deterrence in 
a way that appears to recognise and respond, cost-effectively, to the evidence base of the risk and the 
threat.  
 
Cyberfraud harms the interests of almost all licit business, government and individuals, though not 
equally. The need for a law enforcement response is unquestionable in principle but is hedged by a 
plethora of issues and limitations in practice, and is not feasible for a large proportion of frauds. In this 
context, we would argue that any law enforcement response must begin by being strategic: which 
other bodies should be involved to do what; what should be the specific roles and responsibilities of 
17 
 
the police and where ‘problem ownership’ should lie in terms of cybercrime and cyberfraud; what we 
(and sub-sets of ‘we’) are prepared to pay for (in money and effort) for greater cybersecurity; and, 
how that security is going to be organised for and/or by the huge numbers of businesses and people 
that are actually and potentially affected, that will broaden further with the risks posed by the Internet 
of Things. We argue that the UK case study provides some grounded data on which to take these 
issues forward, although we would also caution that many initiatives are emerging rather than 
comprehensive and well-established in a developing dynamic commercial environment.  Whatever 
measures are adopted, it is unlikely that they will be simple harm reduction processes (like wearing 
seat belts) but will need to evolve with both private and public sector governance. 
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